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TIPPING THE SCALES: BALANCING THE WEIGHT
OF EQUITY WITH LOAN RESCISSIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY
Corey Scott Hadley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the passage of the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) in 1968,1 consumers
were vulnerable to many deceptive practices employed by creditors when
participating in loan transactions. Following the passage of TILA, it was the hope
of Congress that consumers would now have the tools necessary to fend off
predatory or deceptive credit terms buried within the fine print of a loan
agreement.2 Justice Burger described this shift in policy as a “transition in
congressional policy from a philosophy of ‘Let the buyer beware’ to one of ‘Let the
seller disclose.’ By erecting a barrier between the seller and the prospective
purchaser in the form of hard facts, Congress expressly sought ‘to . . . avoid the
uninformed use of credit.’”3 Unfortunately, Congress could not have foreseen the
explosion in litigation and the multiple judicial interpretations that ensued in future
decades.4 Consequently, a series of legislative enactments over the last forty years
have sought to simplify and clarify disclosure rules for both the consumer and the
creditor.5
One of the options afforded to consumers facing a suspect loan agreement is
the right to rescission.6 When lenders, creditors, and other parties in the credit
transaction “fail to provide the consumer with proper disclosures about the loan or
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law. The Author would like to thank
Peter C. Fessenden, the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee for the District of Maine, and Professor Lois
Lupica for their continued support and feedback.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1968).
2. Elwin Griffith, Truth In Lending—The Right of Rescission, Disclosure of the Finance Charge,
and Itemization of the Amount Financed in Closed-End Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 191
(1998) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90-140, at 9 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1965). Griffith
noted:
In many instances today, consumers do not know the costs of credit. Charges are often
stated in confusing or misleading terms. They are complicated by ‘add-ons’ and discounts
and unfamiliar gimmicks. The consumer should not have to be an actuary or a
mathematician to understand the rate of interest that is being charged.
Id.
3. Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
4. See RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 14 (Robert A. Cook, Alvin C.
Harrell & Elizabeth Huber eds., 2000) (discussing “[t]he resulting flood of litigation produced an
apparently unending, and inconsistent, stream of judicial interpretations and reinterpretations of [Truth
in Lending] requirements”).
5. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221 94 Stat.
168 (1980), and Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1538 (1982)
(current versions codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1608 (2009)).
6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines “rescission” as “the unilateral unmaking of a contract for a
legally sufficient reason, such as the other party’s material breach . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1420-21 (9th ed. 2009).
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their rights,”7 consumers may seek rescission as a possible remedy under TILA.8
Often, a consumer attempts to exercise their rescission rights in the face of an
impending foreclosure due to a default on their loan. Moreover, a natural
consequence of the impending foreclosure will often be the filing of Chapter 13
bankruptcy by the consumer. It is in the Chapter 13 setting that loan rescission
produces diverging views among the various courts.
Once a debtor has exercised his or her right to rescission, TILA outlines a
specific “sequence of procedures to be followed.”9 The sequence of these
procedures10 becomes disrupted in the Chapter 13 setting and has elicited varied
analyses among the courts. Under TILA, the “security interest arising from the
transaction becomes void and the consumer is no longer liable for any amount
owed” following the exercise of rescission.11 Next, the creditor is to return any
money or property in connection with the credit transaction within twenty days and
must take the necessary measures “to reflect the termination of the security
agreement.”12 Finally, after the creditor has fulfilled these obligations, the
consumer must tender back the amount they borrowed.13 The final phase of the
statute states: “The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except
when otherwise ordered by a court.”14 This phrase, added by the Truth in Lending

7. Robert R. Murken, Can’t Get No Satisfaction? Revising How Courts Rescind Home Equity
Loans Under the Truth In Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 457, 457 (2004).
8. It is important to note that the right of rescission does not protect all consumer credit
transactions. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2009) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he regulation
prohibits certain acts or practices in connection with credit secured by a consumer’s principal
dwelling”). Therefore, in order to exercise the right of rescission, a couple of elements must be fulfilled.
First, there must be a credit transaction involving a consumer. Second, there must be a security interest
in the consumer’s principal dwelling.
9. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jaaskelainen (Wells Fargo), 407 B.R. 449, 459 (D. Mass. 2009).
10. TILA requires:
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is
not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor,
including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a
rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return
to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or
otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of
any security interest created under the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any
property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of
the creditor’s obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the
creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or
inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the
location of the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If
the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the
obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to
pay for it. The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when
otherwise ordered by a court.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Simplification and Reform Act,15 has allowed a majority of courts to reorganize the
sequence of procedures to be applied when conditioning rescission to consumers in
a Chapter 13 setting.
To understand the effects of bankruptcy, it is useful to compare similar actions
in a non-bankruptcy context. “In a non-bankruptcy setting, the rights and duties of
the parties upon TIL[A] rescission are clear and absolute. Each party must make
the other as whole as he would have been had the contract never been entered
into.”16 The problem that arises in the bankruptcy setting is that the debtor has
arguably been relieved of his “obligation to pay the creditor upon rescission.”17
The minority of circuit courts reason that once a consumer has rescinded a
transaction in the bankruptcy context the “creditor is left with an unsecured debt . .
. [which] may be discharged . . . and to require a chapter 13 Debtor to tender the
full amount of the loan on a creditor’s now unsecured claim would unfairly
discriminate among unsecured claims . . . .”18 The majority of courts, however,
rely on the statutory language of TILA, which provides “that the procedures . . .
shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.”19 The majority view relies
on this language as a justification for “hav[ing] the equitable power to condition
rescission on tender by the borrower.”20 The equitable power to condition
rescission on tender by the borrower allows the courts to stave off rescission until
the consumer has paid back the creditor the amount they had borrowed.
Surprisingly, the “First Circuit has not spoken”21 as to whether courts have the
equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower. This Comment
will first focus briefly on the historical framework of rescission and how rescission
under TILA is markedly different from common law rescission. Next, this
Comment will examine the splits among the circuits and explore the competing
rationales to determine which circuits may serve as guideposts for the First Circuit.
This Comment will then focus on the potential approaches to rescission in the
bankruptcy setting. Finally, this Comment will consider several recent cases that
may be illustrative of the direction in which the First Circuit is heading. In re
Jaaskelainen,22 a case argued in the Eastern Division of Massachusetts, is
particularly indicative of the trend that the First Circuit might be following and
illustrates the divergent judicial interpretations throughout the circuits.
II. THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF RESCISSION: TILA STANDARDS VS.
COMMON LAW
One of the most influential changes that has stemmed from TILA is the
15. Pub.L. No. 96-221, § 612(a)(4), 94 Stat. 168, 175 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1635(b) (2009)).
16. Jaaskelainen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Jaaskelainen), 391 B.R. 627, 645 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2008), vacated in part by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jaaskelainen (Wells Fargo), 407 B.R. 449
(D. Mass. 2009).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 646.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009).
20. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 460.
21. Id.
22. 391 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008).
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rearranging of the sequence of rescission and tender that had existed under
common law rescission. At common law, “the [consumer] must first tender the
property that he has received under the agreement before the contract may be
considered void.”23 After the consumer had met his obligations, “the contract
becomes void and the [consumer] may then bring an action in replevin24 or
assumpsit25 to insure that the [creditor] will restore him to the position that he was
in prior to entering into the agreement, i.e., return earnest money or monthly
payments and void all security interests.”26 The sequence of events under section
1635(b) of TILA was a pro-consumer departure from the common law standard.
Section 1635(b) requires that the creditor first void all security interests related to
the transaction and then return all money and property also associated with that
transaction.27 Once the creditor has performed his obligations, the consumer must
then tender back the amount they had borrowed.28 In essence, the TILA standard
has rearranged the roles of the principal players.
Section 1635(b) contains language that has produced varied judicial
interpretations beyond the reordering of the rescission process. The pertinent
section states: “If the creditor does not take possession of the property within 20
days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the obligor
without obligation on his part to pay for it.”29 This provision, which has the
potential to produce a “debtor windfall”30 in the event of creditor nonperformance,
has met with considerable resistance from the courts. Much of this resistance
garnered its reasoning from principles of equity rather than statutory authorization.
The final sentence of section 1635(b), which states, “[t]he procedures prescribed by
this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court,”31 has
arguably codified the justification for the court’s prior reliance upon notions of
equitable power. Consequently, many courts have struggled with the application of
this phrase, rather than whether it grants a court powers beyond that intended by
Congress. Although the justification for modifying the TILA rescission framework
may now exist in the majority of circuits, the manner in which the modifications
are exacted is anything but uniform. Ironically, many courts have come almost
full-circle back to the common law rescission scheme and now “require the
consumer to tender loan proceeds up front as a prerequisite to obtaining rescission
under TILA.”32 Some courts have “rescission conditioned on repayment [by the
consumer] in installments, and [some] refus[e] to condition rescission on
23. Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing 17A AM. JUR.
2D Contracts § 590, at 600-01 (1991)).
24. Replevin is an “action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully taken or detained by
the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds the property until the court decides who
owns it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (9th ed. 2009).
25. Generally, assumpsit is an “action based on the defendant’s breach of an implied promise to pay
a debt to the plaintiff.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 142 (9th ed. 2009).
26. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009).
32. Murken, supra note 7, at 468.
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repayment.”33 As a result of these varied approaches throughout the circuits, the
outcomes are often disjointed and incongruous from one circuit to another.
This Comment will focus on circuit court splits between those courts that
require tender by the consumer prior to rescission and those that do not condition
rescission on tender by the consumer. Although the language of section 1635(b) of
TILA is clear and unambiguous, the manner in which it is applied would lead one
to believe otherwise. The majority of courts have relied upon traditional notions of
equity to depart from what appears to be the plain language of the statute in order
to avoid unduly harsh and inequitable results to creditors. How various courts
interpret the sequence of rescission and the ensuing effect on the security interest is
crucial to that security interest’s treatment in the bankruptcy process.
III. COMPETING RATIONALES AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The Majority View: Conditioning Rescission on Tender by the Borrower
Currently, “the majority of circuits to consider the issue agree that courts have
the equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower.”34 The
common thread that runs through these decisions is the ability of the courts to
freely exercise their powers of equitable discretion. Moreover, these courts extract
this notion of equitable discretion not only from the language of TILA, but also
from “congressional intent.”35 Ironically, the same statute that was created to better
inform consumers of their credit rights through disclosure has often shielded
creditors from inequitable results that may ensue from a literal reading of the
statute.36 Although a comprehensive comparative analysis of the various
approaches of all the circuit courts is outside the scope of this Comment, a
sampling of the most frequently cited cases in this field will paint a sufficient
portrait of the current legal landscape.
33. Id. at 467.
34. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 460.
35. Id.; see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264-65,
which states:
Upon application by the consumer or the creditor, a court is authorized to modify this
section’s procedures where appropriate. For example, a court might use this discretion in
a situation where a consumer in bankruptcy or wage earner proceedings is prohibited
from returning the property. The committee expects that the courts, at any time during the
rescission process, may impose equitable conditions to insure that the consumer meets
his obligations after the creditor has performed his obligations as required under the Act.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Household Fin. Corp (In re Ramirez), 329 B.R. 727, 740 (D. Kan. 2005)
(noting that “in the context of bankruptcy, where the borrower seeks to compromise or discharge the
debt on the rescinded loan, judicial modification of the rescission process is well justified”). The court
went on to state that:
Had Congress intended otherwise, there would be no reason to mention bankruptcy, as a
creditor’s secured interest in a debtor’s homestead would be void upon rescission,
relegating the debtor’s remaining obligations to an unsecured, often dischargeable status.
The net effect, then, would be that a debtor receives the entire benefit of the credit
transaction, often substantial sums of money or what amounts to a free house, while the
creditor receives nothing, which would be contrary to the purpose of rescission.
Id. at 742.
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Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank,37 a frequently cited Sixth Circuit case, presented a
classic scenario for the proposition that courts must have the equitable power to
condition rescission upon tender by the borrower. In Rudisell, the debtors engaged
in a credit transaction with Fifth Third Bank in order to finance the installation of
aluminum siding on their home.38 Upon the discovery of disclosure violations
found within the contract, the debtors rescinded the loan and “argue[d] that they
should be allowed to rescind, receive back all monies paid to [the creditor], and
keep the aluminum siding without paying for it.”39 Succinct in its brevity, the court
simply held that “[s]ince rescission is an equitable remedy, the court may condition
the return of monies to the debtor upon the return of the property to the creditor.”40
Because the loan had been consumed by the installation of the aluminum siding,
the debtors were ordered to “tender the reasonable value of the property they
received since they cannot give back what they actually received . . . .”41
The factual scenario in Rudisell is a classic example of a situation that often
leads the debtor to consider filing for bankruptcy. When a homeowner has
financed a large sum of money for home improvements, with their home as the
security interest, and they later find a disclosure violation in their loan agreement,
what are their options in jurisdictions that condition the rescission of the loan on
their ability to give back that which they have already consumed? For many
debtors, they seek refuge in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy setting. Unfortunately for the
debtors, the bankruptcy setting is not a clear path to debt relief in this situation. As
discussed below, the majority of courts are resistant to relegating this form of debt
to unsecured status, dischargeable in the bankruptcy setting.
For example, in Yamamoto v. Bank of New York,42 the Ninth Circuit held that
“a court may impose conditions on rescission that assure that the borrower meets
her obligations once the creditor has performed its obligations.”43 In Yamamoto,
the debtors were refinancing an existing mortgage when they defaulted on the loan
and subsequently alleged disclosure violations in the loan agreement. The
Yamamoto court focused not only on whether they had the equitable power to
modify the sequence of rescission under TILA, but also on whether rescission is
automatic upon a debtor’s notice. The court held “[n]either the statute nor the
regulation establishes that a borrower’s mere assertion of the right of rescission has
the automatic effect of voiding the contract.”44 In essence, the court has the
equitable power to determine whether rescission has occurred in addition to
altering the sequence of rescission events. The Yamamoto court pointed out that
although courts do not have the discretion to alter “substantive provisions,”45 they
do have the discretion to alter “procedural provisions.”46

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

622 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id.
329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1172 (quoting Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 1171.
Id.
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Consequently, in American Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton,47 the Fourth
Circuit addressed the procedural requirements associated with the right of
rescission under section 1635(b). The debtors refinanced an existing mortgage on
their primary residence in order to purchase an additional home, but because of
some discrepancies within the loan documents, they decided to cancel the
transaction within the proper timeframe as allowed by TILA.48 Upon advice from
counsel, the debtors offered to sell their new home to the creditor in lieu of a cash
payment in order to tender back the principal amount of their loan.49 The creditor
declined this offer and “refused to release its security interest without any provision
for repayment of the loan proceeds.”50 The debtors countered that the creditor’s
failure to release its security interest within the twenty days as required by TILA
resulted in the “forfeit[ure] [of] the loan proceeds.”51 The court held that the
debtors had “misconstrued the procedural mechanics of § 1635(b) . . . [because] it
was not the intent of Congress to reduce the mortgage company to an unsecured
creditor . . . .”52 Relying on traditional notions of equity and earlier decisions,53 the
court “adopt[ed] the majority view of reviewing courts that unilateral notification
of cancellation does not automatically void the loan contract.”54
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of equitable conditioning in Williams
v. Homestake Mortgage Co.,55 and held that “a court may impose conditions that
run with the voiding of a creditor’s security interest upon terms that would be
equitable and just to the parties in view of all the surrounding circumstances.”56 In
Williams, the borrowers entered into a loan transaction primarily to consolidate
existing mortgages and to finance the remodeling of a bathroom.57 Upon later
inspection of the loan documents, the borrowers discovered several TILA
disclosure violations and sought rescission of the transaction.58 The creditor
“conceded that rescission was an appropriate remedy [but] . . . sought modification
of the normal statutory rescission provisions, arguing that . . . the voiding of its
security interest in Williams’ home should be conditioned upon the return of [the
money] that Williams owe[d] in unpaid principal.”59 In Williams, the court echoed
the reasoning of the majority view by maintaining that the “addition of the last
sentence of 1635(b)60. . . was a reflection of an equitable goal.”61 The reasoning
47. 486 F.3d 815 (4th Cir. 2007).
48. Id. at 817-18.
49. Id. at 818.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 820-21.
53. See, e.g., Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976) (explaining that “when
rescission is attempted under circumstances which would deprive the lender of its legal due, the
attempted rescission will not be judicially enforced unless it is so conditioned that the lender will be
assured of receiving its legal due”).
54. Shelton, 486 F.3d at 821.
55. 968 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 1142.
57. Id. at 1138.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2009) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he procedures prescribed by this
subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court”).
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that had existed throughout the majority of circuits prior to the enactment of the
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act62 was simply codified via the
additional language in section 1635(b). The court held that judicial modification of
the rescission procedures was appropriate and consistent with Congressional intent.
The Rudisell, Yamamoto, Shelton, and Williams decisions are just a sampling
of the pervasive view surrounding rescission procedures in the various circuits.
Principles of equity, limited to the procedural reshuffling of rescission sequencing,
are the common threads that run through these holdings. Where statutory authority
is silent, bankruptcy courts rely on their equitable powers to apply the law. Where
equity is implied from the language of a statute, the courts may yield a doubleedged sword: one edge from Congress’s express authority, and the other from the
court’s ability to equitably interpret the statute. Although express congressional
authority and case law justify the majority approach, this Comment will highlight
the possible inequities that arise within this equitable framework.
B. The Minority View: Tender Should Not be Required as a Condition for
Rescission
In Sosa v. Fite,63 the Fifth Circuit held that following rescission, a creditor who
failed to complete their obligations, as outlined in TILA, could forfeit their right to
the debtor’s tender of the principal amount of the loan.64 The circumstances in
Sosa presented several scenarios that are not typical of most rescission actions.
The borrower entered into a loan transaction with a creditor and a contractor that
secured her home in return for financing for aluminum siding for that home.65 The
borrower consistently made payments on the loan until the poor work of the
contractor led her to make no further payments on the loan.66 Shortly thereafter,
the creditor foreclosed on the home and the borrower rescinded the loan based on
several serious disclosure violations within the loan documents.67 Included within
her notice of rescission, the borrower made an “express offer to return the
aluminum siding, an overture which elicited no response whatsoever from the
creditors.”68 Following the offer to tender back the aluminum siding, the creditors
made no effort to terminate the security interest in the borrower’s home.69 The
creditor’s failure to abide by the statutory scheme as dictated by section 1635(b)
was, in the eyes of the court, fatal to the creditor’s ability to obtain conditional
rescission.70
61. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140.
62. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 96-221, § 612(a)(4), 94 Stat. 168,
175 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1988)).
63. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 120.
65. Id. at 116.
66. Id. as 116-17.
67. Id. at 117.
68. Id. at 118.
69. Sosa, 498 F.2d at 118.
70. Id. at 118-19. The court noted:
The significance of Sosa’s proffered return and the creditors’ failure to comply with clear
statutory directives is that Sosa did in fact attempt to make a tender, even though under a
literal reading of the statute the creditors were unentitled to any tender at all by virtue of
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Sosa is distinct from most rescission transactions for several key reasons.
First, upon rescission, the borrower made an attempt to tender back the property
purchased by the loan. Second, the creditors made no attempt to release the
security interest in the debtor’s home as mandated by section 1635(b). Finally, the
reasoning employed by the court was prior to the passage of the Truth in Lending
Simplification and Reform Act. Although the court did not have the modern
codified language of section 1635(b) to rely upon in relation to conditional
rescission, it could easily have employed the long-standing notion of equity upon
which the majority of courts have relied. The minority view has the potential to
create a debtor windfall in circumstances where the creditor has failed to properly
disclose the terms of the loan agreement. Contract law attempts to deter debtor
windfalls and prefers to return parties to their positions prior to entering the
contract. The Sosa court argued that the facts presented were precisely one of the
situations in which a debtor windfall would be justifiable.71
The Fifth Circuit again addressed the issue of conditional rescission in Gerasta
v. Hibernia National Bank,72 and shortly thereafter in Harris v. Tower Loan of
Mississippi, Inc.73 In both cases, the court “refused to permit judicial modification
where Congress had provided for none.”74 In Gerasta, the court stressed that “the
[creditor’s] duties are in no way conditional upon the [consumer’s] tender of the
loan proceeds.”75 In Harris, the court echoed the reasoning in Gerasta when it
stated “we do not permit a creditor to refuse to perform unless or until the obligor
tenders payment.”76
Although the minority approach relies upon a strict adherence to the statutory
language and sequencing of TILA, it may be viewed as doing so at the expense of
fairness and equity. In order for rescission to exist as an effective remedy for the
misinformed borrower, the exercise of rescission occasionally places harsh
penalties at the feet of creditors. “While the goal should always be to ‘restor[e] the
parties to the status quo ante,’ rescission must also maintain its vitality as an
enforcement tool.”77 Section 1635(b) provides that a creditor may be subject to
their failure to perform their express obligation of expurgating records of references to
the invalidated security interest.
Id.
71. Id. at 119. The court explained that:
Congress’ intended operation of the statute, as evidenced by the 1635(b) creditorforfeiture provision, therefore clearly calls for a debtor windfall if the creditor does not
set about to rectify his earlier nondisclosures in the manner envisaged by the statute. In
fact, the Act flatly provides that if his creditor continues in his untoward ways, the debtor
incurs no obligation to pay for property which he is at the same time entitled to keep.
That this result was intended is clear beyond peradventure, for one of the measure’s
principal sponsors in the House stated: ‘[I]f the seller does not come back to pick up [his
property] after a 10-day period [following the notice of rescission], the buyer can keep
this item and he does not even have to pay for it . . . .
Id. (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14398 (1968) (remarks of Congresswoman Sullivan)).
72. 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978).
73. 609 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1140.
75. Gerasta, 575 F.2d at 585.
76. Harris, 609 F.2d at 123.
77. Williams, 968 F.2d at 1142 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Harris, 609 F.2d at 123).
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harsh penalties for non-compliance, but these penalties are rarely exercised because
of the potential for drastic consequences to creditors for minor errors or omissions.
This Comment puts forth the proposition that, in some instances, harsh penalties
are warranted because of the nature of the violations and the conduct of the
creditor. In order for TILA to promote unfettered disclosure between debtors and
creditors, these harsh penalties must occasionally be available to consumers.
IV. APPROACHES TO RESCISSION IN THE CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY SETTING
A. An Exercise in Equity
The underlying reasons for a Chapter 13 filing are numerous—ranging from
drastic changes in the debtors’ economic condition to litigation strategies in order
to automatically stay78 an impending foreclosure. Because foreclosure may be a
bankruptcy-inducing event, debtors must be aware of the differing approaches that
exist within the courts because these procedures dictate the treatment of their
estate. Because of the nuances and complexities that arise between various
bankruptcy chapters, this Section will focus primarily on the various approaches to
rescission in the Chapter 13 setting. However, the overarching analysis is
applicable within the different bankruptcy chapters.
The procedural complexities and sequence of events that dictate the path of a
transaction that is attempting to be rescinded are not clear-cut. To illustrate,
assume that a creditor holds a $100,000 refinancing loan secured by an interest in
the principal residence of Jane. Because of material disclosures found within the
refinancing contract, Jane exercises her right to rescission within the applicable
time frame. Under section 1635(b) of TILA, the following sequence of events
occurs: the creditor voids the security interest in the home; the creditor must then
return any finance charges, payments, or down payments made by Jane within
twenty days of the rescission notice; and finally, once the creditor has performed
his obligations, Jane must tender back the principal of the loan. If Jane files for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy at some point during this process, several complexities may
arise: What is the nature of the security interest in her home in the bankruptcy
setting? Is the previously secured interest now relegated to an unsecured status,
dischargeable in the bankruptcy setting? Is the rescission automatic or conditional?
The answers to these questions vary depending on the court.
B. Rescission: Automatic or Conditional?
The majority views of bankruptcy courts mirror the majority views of nonbankruptcy courts in the exercise of conditional rescission.79 The equitable nature
of rescission has been at the heart of the majority reasoning in the bankruptcy
arena.80 One of the primary concerns in the bankruptcy context is the relegation of

78. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1979).
79. See, e.g., Lynch v. GMAC, 170 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (stating “[t]his Court can see
no reason why the circuit courts and the district court[s], in exercising their equitable powers, can
condition the right of rescission, but the bankruptcy court cannot”).
80. See Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 461.
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a creditor’s secured interest to an unsecured interest.81 Whether a security interest
is demoted to an unsecured status hinges largely upon the timing of rescission,
which in turn is determined by whether the rescission was automatic or
conditional.82 Divergent views arise within the bankruptcy courts as to whether the
notice of rescission, when exercised by the debtor, automatically voids the security
interest.83
The majority of courts, “including the First Circuit, have concluded that
rescission does not flow automatically from the borrower’s mailing of a notice of
rescission.”84 Although this reasoning may appear to depart from the statutory
language of TILA, courts have interpreted section 1635(b) to require that “the
security interest becomes void when the [borrower] exercises a right to rescind that
is available in the particular case, either because the creditor acknowledges that the
right of rescission is available, or because the appropriate decision maker has so
determined.”85 Courts have justified this interpretation based on notions of equity,
largely in favor of creditors, and the belief that to allow borrowers to simply allege
rescission is an “untenable proposition.”86
In contrast, bankruptcy courts holding that rescission flows automatically from
the notice of rescission from the borrower rely simply on the literal reading of
section 1635(b).87 In a bankruptcy setting, this view argues that “there is a
legitimate, legal impediment to the debtor’s reciprocal performance. It would be
palpably unfair to deny the relief to which a consumer is entitled under TIL[A]
because that consumer has also availed himself of bankruptcy relief.”88 This
consumer-friendly approach addresses some of the problems and inequities that
existed prior to TILA under traditional rules of contract law.89
81. See id.
82. See id. at 458-59.
83. See, e.g., id. at 459 (holding “[n]either [TILA] or [Regulation Z] establishes ‘that a borrowers
mere assertion of the right of rescission has the automatic effect of voiding the contract’”) (quoting
Large, 292 F.3d at 54)); Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“[R]eject[ing] the argument that a demand for rescission under TILA is somehow self-executing and
results in the automatic voiding of the loan agreement”); and Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329
F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the mere “communicat[ion] by a notice of rescission
[constitutes rescission] makes no sense, when . . . the lender contests the ground upon which the
borrower rescinds”); but see In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 645 (holding “[u]pon the valid exercise of
the right of rescission, the security interest becomes void”).
84. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 458-59.
85. Large, 292 F.3d at 54-55.
86. Id. at 55.
87. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 645.
88. Id. at 645-46.
89. See T. Nelson Mann, Truth-In-Lending: Judicial Modification of the Right of Rescission, 1974
DUKE L.J. 1227, 1231 (1974). The author provides a valuable hypothetical that illustrates pre-TILA
problems that may arise in the bankruptcy or insolvency setting:
Assume, for example, that a consumer purchased storm windows costing $2,000 and that
he paid for them by check. Shortly thereafter, he discovered that the contract was
voidable, rescinded the agreement by returning the windows to the seller, and demanded
restoration of his payment. If the seller accepted the storm windows but refused to return
the money paid, the consumer could bring an action at law to recover his property, but he
would be at a serious disadvantage. He not only would have lost the use of the storm
windows and his money, but he would also bear the risk that by the time he obtains an
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Because of the inequities and possible abuses that could arise in situations of
automatic rescission, the majority of circuits still rely on their equitable power to
exercise conditional rescission in the bankruptcy setting. Ironically, TILA, enacted
to protect and better inform consumers in credit transactions, rarely exercises its
rescission powers to an extent that allows consumers to enjoy a windfall in the
bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy setting although the statute clearly provides that this
windfall does indeed exist.
C. The Home: Secured or Unsecured?
The determination of whether rescission is automatic or conditional has
significant consequences in evaluating the status of the security interest. If the
borrower’s notice of rescission is found to automatically void the creditor’s
security interest, that security interest may be relegated to an unsecured status in
the bankruptcy setting.90 One consequence of the security interest becoming
unsecured is that the borrower may be able to have that unsecured debt discharged
in bankruptcy.91 In essence, the unsecured loan may be treated like other consumer
debt, such as credit card debt. The principal dwelling of a borrower is one of the
most common security interests that exists in the consumer-lending arena and is the
most relevant interest when examining rescission under section 1635(b) of TILA.
Furthermore, a debtor whose principal residence is secured by a second mortgage
or a refinancing agreement, wholly unsupported by equity, may have that loan
“stripped off” and avoided through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.92 In order to
understand the importance of the nature of the debtor’s security interest, it is
meaningful to understand the role of equity as it relates to that security interest.
A fundamental principle of bankruptcy law is that the bankruptcy court is a
court of equity.93 Because the term “equity” has various meanings within
bankruptcy jurisprudence,94 it is beyond the scope of this Comment to explore the
intricacies of each definition. There are several key sections within the bankruptcy
code that apply principles of equity to situations involving creditor misconduct.
Under section 510 of Title 11 of the United States Code,95 a creditor’s claims may

enforceable judgment the seller may no longer be solvent. Furthermore, the burden of
bringing suit would fall entirely on the consumer, who must assume litigation expenses if
he is to recover any of the consideration that he has paid.
Id.
90. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 646.
91. Id.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2009).
93. Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214
(1945); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 535
(1900).
94. The term “equity” has various meanings depending on the context in which it is used. Equity
has historically been linked to issues of “jurisdiction, procedures, court powers, justice, an ownership
interest, or type of right.” Adam J. Levitin, Toward A Federal Common Law Of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking In A Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6 (2006).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (2009). Section 510 states in relevant part:
(a) A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent
that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
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be equitably subordinated to other creditors’ claims because of misconduct on the
part of the offending creditor. Equitable subordination allows a bankruptcy court
to procedurally reorganize the priority of the offending creditor’s claim in respect
to other creditors.96 Thus, the nature of the debtor’s security interest becomes vital
to the reorganization of the estate and in determining which creditors will get paid
first. If a creditor’s security interest goes from secured to unsecured status, the
creditor’s collateral is at risk of discharge if the debtor files for bankruptcy. The
creditor’s collateral is especially at-risk if there are multiple creditors and limited
assets.
Consequently, for creditors to maximize the recovery of assets in bankruptcy,
they must maintain their priority as a secured creditor or face the risk of limited
recovery. Absent a TILA violation, creditors enjoy considerable protection of their
security interest in the debtor’s home under the bankruptcy code.97 If a creditor’s
interest is demoted to an unsecured status, the risk of discharge is increased even
further and the creditor may see no recovery. The relegation of a creditor’s
formerly secured interest to one that is unsecured is a frightening scenario for
creditors in the bankruptcy setting. This unsecured debt leaves open the possibility
of a creditor leaving the bankruptcy table empty-handed. The threat of an
unsecured interest in bankruptcy is a powerful motivator for creditors to fight
tooth-and-nail to maintain their security interest in a debtor’s home.
D. In re Jaaskelainen: An Illustration of the Future?
A recent case from the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Massachusetts Eastern Division, illustrates some of the competing rationales
lurking within the First Circuit. In In re Jaaskelainen,98 the debtor-borrowers were

(b) For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a
purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages
arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for reimbursement or contribution
allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to all claims
or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or interest represented by such security,
except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common
stock.
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, the
court may—
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim
or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the
estate.
Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2009). Section 1322(b) states in relevant part:
The plan may . . . modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured by only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal
residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of
any class of claims.
Id.
98. 391 B.R. 627 (2008).
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facing an imminent foreclosure of their home in Massachusetts.99 In order to avoid
foreclosure, the debtors entered into a refinancing agreement with a creditor.100
The refinancing mortgage and note was secured by the debtor’s home.101 Less than
a year after the refinancing, the debtors defaulted on their loan payments and
consulted an attorney to “get a financial overview of their predicament.”102 Upon
inspection of the closing documents, the attorney discovered that the debtor’s had
not received the correct number of Notices of Right to Cancel (the NOR) as
mandated by TILA and Regulation Z.103 On behalf of the debtors, the attorney sent
the creditors written notification of a request for rescission of the refinancing.104
Approximately one week after requesting rescission, the debtors filed for Chapter
13 bankruptcy and listed the refinancing debt as unsecured non-priority debt on
their Schedule F.105 The creditors subsequently “filed a proof of claim asserting a
claim . . . secured by real property.”106 The debtors then filed an objection to the
creditor’s claim and soon thereafter the creditors commenced an adversary
proceeding.107
The creditors argued that the mere assertion of rescission is not tantamount to
an automatic rescission, but rather rescission should be conditioned upon tender of
the principal.108 The creditors “assert[ed] that rescission of the loan without
requiring tender would be entirely inequitable and constitute a severe penalty to
[creditors] and an undeserved windfall for the [d]ebtors.”109
The debtors argued that they did not receive the required number of NOR’s
pursuant to TILA, which “gave rise to an extended rescission period, during which
they validly exercised their right.”110 Furthermore, the debtors argued “that they
ha[d] no obligation to tender funds back to the [creditors] in light of their
bankruptcy filing . . . and it [was] well established in [their] district that tender is
not a condition of rescission in Chapter 13.”111 Relying upon In re Myers112 and In
re Whitley,113 the debtors argued that, in Massachusetts, conditional rescission is
inappropriate in the bankruptcy setting.114 Addressing the issue of equity, Judge
Hillman stated in Myers that “[t]he equities . . . lie in the debtor’s favor. Upholding
99. Id. at 631.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 633-34.
103. Id. at 635.
104. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 635.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 639.
109. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 636.
110. Id. at 636.
111. Id. at 637. See Myers v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg., Co. (In re Myers), 175 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1994) (holding that “rescission by a[] [debtor] is not conditioned by tender or payment in the
context of a bankruptcy case”)) and Whitley v. Rhodes Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Whitley), 177 B.R. 142,
153 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (holding that the debtor was not required to tender in order for rescission to
be valid).
112. 175 B.R. 122 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
113. 177 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
114. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 637.
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the creditor’s plea . . . would allow the creditor to escape the consequences of a
serious TIL[A] violation, while at the same time negating the fresh start given the
debtors upon discharge.”115 Judge Hillman went on to state that “[j]udicial
preconditioning of cancellation of the creditor’s lien on the [debtor’s] tender is
inappropriate in bankruptcy cases.”116 The court in In re Whitley also held that
there should not be a bright-line rule that conditions rescission upon the tender by
the borrower. Applying principles of equity, Judge Feeney stated:
[C]ourts in their effort to insure a just result should not forget that the TILA was
passed primarily to aid the unsophisticated consumer and that it was intended to
balance scales thought to be weighted in favor of lenders and . . . to be liberally
construed in favor of borrowers.117

In In re Jaaskelainen, Judge Hillman, applying his earlier reasoning from In re
Myers, found the position of the debtor more persuasive than that of the creditor.
Judge Hillman stated that “rescission by an obligor is not conditioned by tender or
payment in the context of a bankruptcy case.”118 Additionally, the court expounded
on its rationale for treating rescission in the bankruptcy context different than
outside of bankruptcy by stating:
Essentially, when a borrower rescinds a transaction and the security interest is
terminated as a matter of law, the creditor is left with an unsecured debt. Outside a
bankruptcy proceeding, this characterization is of little consequence because
unsecured debts must otherwise be paid in full, failing which, a creditor may take
steps to reacquire a security interest. In a bankruptcy proceeding, however,
unsecured debts are paid pro rata and may be discharged without payment.
Requiring a Chapter 13 Debtor to tender the full amount of the loan on a creditor’s
now unsecured claim would unfairly discriminate among unsecured claims in
119
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).

Based on notions of equity, section 1635(b) of TILA has in the majority of
cases applied a court’s power to condition rescission in favor of creditors. In the
bankruptcy context, rescission becomes more complex because the courts must
balance the technical considerations of bankruptcy against the Truth-in-Lending
guidelines. Rescission is a tool that is capable of producing inequitable results in
an area of law, namely bankruptcy, which is charged with upholding traditional
notions of equity. It is inevitable that harsh or inequitable outcomes will result
from adversarial proceedings involving a debtor and creditor. “Although the policy
of avoiding harsh Truth-in-Lending sanctions has great weight in cases where both
damages and rescission of the debt are imposed by the Act, we find it inapplicable
when the harshness results from events, [i.e., bankruptcy] independent of the Truth-

115. In re Myers, 175 B.R. at 129 (quoting In re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004, 1007-08 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1982)).
116. In re Myers, 175 B.R. at 128 (quoting Celona v. Equitable Nat’l Bank, 98 B.R. 705, 707 (E.D.
Pa. 1989)).
117. In re Whitley, 177 B.R. at 152-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 645.
119. Id. at 646. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2009) states that “[i]f the plan classifies claims, [the plan
shall] provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class.” Id. (relating to a debtor’s
bankruptcy plan).
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in-Lending claim.”120 In In re Jaaskelainen, the court found the creditors inequity
arguments unpersuasive and found that “[r]equiring a Chapter 13 Debtor to tender
the full amount of the loan on a creditor’s now unsecured claim would unfairly
discriminate among unsecured claims in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).”121
The apparent victory for the minority view in In re Jaaskelainen was shortlived. On appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
vacated the “determination that rescission may not be conditioned upon tender by
Debtors.”122 Relying on the majority view among the circuit courts, Judge Zobel
concluded that “rescission does not flow automatically from the [debtor’s] mailing
of a notice of rescission.”123 In addition to the traditional equity arguments that
rely upon section 1635(b) for courts to procedurally modify the rescission
sequence, Judge Zobel focused with equal force on congressional intent. Arguing
that one of the objectives in the enactment of section 1635(b) was to restore the
status quo ante; Judge Zobel reasoned that this objective could not be met if
rescission was found to be automatic upon the mere assertion of the debtor.124 The
District Court’s reasoning and holding on appeal is consistent with the modern
approach to rescission in bankruptcy. With the historical precedent of equity on
their side, it would be a monumental task for the minority position to jettison the
equity argument in favor of a literal reading of the sequence of events set forth in
the statute. In this regard, In re Jaaskelainen is likely an illustration of the future—
courts will almost unilaterally condition rescission on tender by the debtor.
Following the District Court’s ruling in In re Jaaskelainen, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Western Division, issued a
holding similar in effect to that provided by the Bankruptcy Court in In re
Jaaskelainen. Judge Boroff, in In re Giza,125 “respectfully [took] a different
view”126 from Judge Zobel’s opinion and reasoned that the procedures that may be
modified “occur[] after the security interest has been voided.”127 The debtors in In
re Giza refinanced their property in Palmer, Massachusetts and later discovered
that their refinancing documents were missing the requisite number of NOR’s and
Truth-in-Lending disclosures.128 The debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy
approximately one year later and listed their refinance lender’s debt as unsecured
on their bankruptcy schedules.129 Per the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan, their lender

120. In re Piercy, 18 B.R. at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. In re Jaaskelainen, 391 B.R. at 627.
122. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 463.
123. Id. at 458-59.
124. Id. at 460. Judge Zobel relied heavily on Ray v. Citifinancial, Inc. for his explanation of
Congress’s intent which, in relevant part, stated:
Within the meaning of the law, “rescission” does not mean an annulment that is
definitively accomplished by unilateral pronouncement. Rather, it contemplates a remedy
that restores the status quo ante. If a party has a legal or equitable right to annul a
transaction, he may do so, but only upon returning any benefit he has received.
Ray v. Citifinancial, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 664, 667 (D. Md. 2002).
125. Giza v. Amcap Mortg. Inc. (In re Giza), 428 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010).
126. Id. at 273.
127. Id. at 275.
128. Id. at 268-69.
129. Id. at 269.
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would receive a pro rata share of the dividends that would be paid out to the
unsecured creditors.130 The lender objected to the plan, relying largely in part on
the decision of Judge Zobel in In re Jaaskelainen.131
Judge Boroff’s approach makes a crucial distinction between the process of
rescission and the voiding of the security interest—they are separate according to
Massachusetts General Laws. The provision in the Massachusetts’s version of
TILA, supplemented through the Massachusetts Code of Regulations, is structured
in a manner that allows for the rescission procedures to be modified, but explicitly
does not address the process of modifying the underlying security interest.132
Judge Boroff, like Judge Hillman in In re Jaaskelainen, reasoned that requiring the
debtor to tender the proceeds to their lender “would violate the requirements of §
1322(a)(3) by giving [the lender] unsecured preferential treatment.”133 Because of
the amount of the lender’s claim, the debtor’s unsecured creditors would receive
little, possibly nothing, in dividends.134 Furthermore, Judge Boroff reasoned that
even if tender is required for rescission, the court needs to examine the debtor’s
ability to pay the principal amount.135 The court ultimately decided that, if the
conditions for rescission were met, it would “determine the amount of tender and
order the [debtors] to classify that claim and treat it consistently with those of other
130. Id.
131. In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 273.
132. The Massachusetts law states, in relevant part:
(4) Effects of Rescission
(a) When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of
rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including
any finance charge.
(b) Within 20 calendar days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return
any money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the transaction
and shall take any action necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest.
(c) If the creditor has delivered any money or property, the consumer may retain
possession until the creditor has met its obligation under 209 CMR 32.23(4)(b). When the
creditor has complied with 209 CMR 32.23(4)(b), the consumer shall tender the money
or property to the creditor or, where the latter would be impracticable or inequitable,
tender its reasonable value. At the consumer’s option, tender of property may be made at
the location of the property or at the consumer’s residence. Tender of money must be
made at the creditor’s designated place of business. If the creditor does not take
possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days after the consumer’s tender,
the consumer may keep it without further obligation.
(d) The procedures outlined in 209 CMR 32.23(4)(b) and (c) may be modified by court
order.
209 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.23 (2010). Accordingly, under Judge Boroff’s reasoning, the procedures that
may be modified occur after the security interest has already been extinguished and the procedures that
may be modified occur in an environment where there is no longer a remaining security interest.
133. In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 275. Section 1322(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “if the plan
classifies claims, [the plan shall] provide the same treatment for each claim within a particular class . . .
.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2009).
134. In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 275.
135. Id. at 275 (quoting Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 462 (urging the bankruptcy court on remand to
consider “the appropriate conditions to impose on Debtor’s exercise of rescission. In understanding this
evaluation the bankruptcy court should consider traditional equitable notions, including such factors as
the severity of Appellants’ MCCCDA violation and the degree to which Debtors are able to pay the
principal amount”)).
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unsecured creditors.”136 Although the holding of the Giza court disagreed with that
of the District Court, the reasoning and outcome harmonized the Massachusetts
version of the TILA laws with the United States Bankruptcy Code. Rescission may
be allowed, but it does not follow that the debtor will walk away from the
obligation—the court may establish the appropriate tender amount leaving the onus
on the debtor to then determine the classification of the now unsecured claim.
E. The Maine Approach
Although there is very little case law in Maine regarding conditional rescission
of a loan in the bankruptcy setting, the limited law that does exist does not bode
well for debtors. One of the few cases in the First Circuit, and the only one from
Maine, that has addressed this issue has found that rescission can be conditioned
upon tender by the borrower. In New Maine National Bank v. Gendron,137 the
District Court held that when “[debtors] have the right to rescind the loan
transaction with [a creditor], such rescission is subject, in the exercise of the
Court’s discretion, to being conditioned upon the return of the loan proceeds.”138
Adopting the majority approach of courts, Judge Carter stated that “equity demands
such condition[al] rescission.”139 In Gendron, the debtors were seeking rescission
of a loan acquired to satisfy tax liabilities and later discovered a disclosure
violation in their loan documents.140 Shortly thereafter, the debtors filed a Chapter
7 petition for bankruptcy.141 Although the court recognized the debtors’ right to
rescission, principle of equity governed the court’s statutory grant of rescission.
Nearly one hundred and seventy years prior to Gendron, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, set forth the proposition that has been
embraced by the modern majority of circuits. In Norton v. Young,142 the Law Court
held that, in exchanging goods, where “one person defrauds the other, who elects to
rescind the contract, it is not enough for the injured person to give notice to the
other and call on him to receive his goods, but he must return them to the person
defrauding him before any right of action accrues.”143 Because Young dealt with
fraud being exercised upon the debtor seeking to rescind, the conditional rescission
declaration may be more forceful. In many instances of asserted rescission, the
debtor is relying upon a minor or technical omission within the closing documents.
The importance of restoring the status quo ante in situations where the debtor is a
victim of fraud is indicative of the courts reluctance to impute an inequity on even
the wrongdoers. Additionally, this case was not argued in the bankruptcy context,
but it is apparent that traditional notions of contract law have continued to
influence rescission disputes.
The Maine equivalent of TILA, codified as part of the Maine Consumer Credit

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

In re Giza, 428 B.R. at 276.
780 F. Supp. 52 (D. Me. 1991).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
3 Me. 30 (1824).
Id.
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Code (MCCC Truth-in-Lending),144 allows for the sequence of procedures to be
modified by the court in the same manner provided by TILA. The only significant
departure of the MCCC Truth-in-Lending from TILA is the inclusion of the
language “[i]f the creditor has delivered any property to the [debtor], the [debtor]
may retain possession of it.”145 Apart from the varied language between the
MCCC Truth-in-Lending and TILA, Judge Carter relied on the almost identical
amended language of both statutes, particularly the omnipresent phrase: “The
procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered
by a court.”146 Maine echoes the approach taken by most courts by providing that
rescission can be conditioned upon tender by the borrower.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
As Judge Zobel stated in Wells Fargo, “[a]lthough the First Circuit has not
spoken, the majority of circuit courts to consider the issue agree that courts have
the equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower.”147 Even in
the absence of a direct ruling by the First Circuit, it appears likely that the majority
view will be adopted. One of the principal motives behind TILA was to provide
consumers with an accurate portrayal of the financial transaction they were
entering. Creditors could still charge exorbitant interest rates over questionable
durations—they simply had to disclose that fact according to the provisions set
forth in TILA. The dominant position has been to allow consumers to rescind the
transaction upon a later discovered omission, conditioned on their return of the
principal loan amount. The subordinate position has been to apply a literal reading
of the statute and allow the consumer to rescind the transaction and have their
security interest terminated, with the final step of the process being the tender back
of the principal loan amount. Arguably, each position visits some inequity on the
party whose view is not advanced by the court. This Comment asserts that there
144. 9-A M.R.S.A. § 8-101 et seq. (2009) (Maine Consumer Credit Code—Truth-in-Lending). The
Maine Consumer Credit Code—Truth-in-Lending is almost identical to that of TILA and states in
relevant part:
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection 1, he is not liable for any
finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor, including any such
interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days
after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or
property given as earnest money, down payment or otherwise, and shall take any action
necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under
the transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may
retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor’s obligations under this
section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of the
property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall tender its
reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of the property or at the residence
of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the creditor does not take possession of the
property within 20 days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the property vests in the
obligor without obligation on his part to pay for it. The procedures of this section shall
apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.
9-A M.R.S.A § 8-204(2).
145. Id.
146. Gendron, 780 F. Supp. at 60.
147. Wells Fargo, 407 B.R. at 460.
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are alternative positions supported by case law that may depart from the majority
and minority views but still fall under the umbrella of equity.
At first glance, it appears that the court’s power to condition rescission is
limited to one of two scenarios: first, that rescission is automatic and the creditor
terminates the security interest and will then be tendered back their loan principal;
and second, the consumer must tender back the principal, at which point the
security interest is terminated and the loan is rescinded. Under the language of
section 1635(b), however, “[t]he procedures prescribed by this subsection shall
apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.”148 Although this provision has
been applied almost exclusively to the aforementioned scenarios, the courts have
the statutory authority to condition rescission on factors that may exercise more
equity in favor of the debtors than the majority approach. This flexible approach
may be labeled the “balancing rescission model.”
The balancing rescission model may be seen as a fusion of the existing
approaches found across the spectrum of courts. The model may be applied by
weighing the depth or seriousness of the TILA violation against the debtor’s
proposed rescission and underlying financial position. The scale for this test has
three positions: the first position is weighted in favor of the debtor; the second is a
point of equilibrium, where the parties are returned to the positions they were in
before the transaction; and the third position is weighted in favor of the creditor.
For the test to weigh in favor of the debtor, the court would need to find
particularly egregious or predatory behavior on the part of the lender. In this
scenario, the court should be less inclined to condition rescission upon tender by
the borrower if they are a victim of fraud or unscrupulous behavior. Additionally,
this approach requires the court to tailor its reasoning to the facts specific to the
case at hand, but also liberates the courts from being tethered to a bright-line rule
that introduces uncertainty and inequity in certain loan transactions. Cases that fall
under this line of reasoning are compelling and re-enforce the public policy
rationale that is invariably embedded in the TILA.
For example, in Cole v. Lovett,149 the debtors were solicited by vinyl siding
salesmen at their home and eventually agreed to have the siding installed. Prior to
installation, the debtors requested that the company delay the installation because
they were not sure if they still wanted the siding.150 Despite the debtor’s request to
delay installation, the workers began work immediately and prior to the statutory
three-day expiration for the right to rescind.151 Additionally, the sellers failed to
notify the debtors that they were securing the siding by taking a security interest in
their home, and failed to properly provide the debtors with all the necessary
disclosure documents.152 The court stated:
[The sellers] attempted to deprive plaintiffs of their right to rescind, first, by
failing to inform them of the right and, secondly, by subtly forcing them to accept
the siding . . . although rescission is an equitable remedy and conditions may be

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2010).
672 F. Supp 947 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
Id. at 948.
Id. at 956.
Id.
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placed on the exercise of that right, the equity in this case does not lie with the
defendants.153

Although this holding seems to parallel that of the minority position, the
deceitful conduct of the sellers factored heavily into the court’s reasoning. The
sellers’ behavior was precisely the type of conduct that TILA sought to deter and,
accordingly, the seller was forced to bear the brunt of the losses. Lovett illustrates
one end of the spectrum of the “balancing rescission model” proposed in this
Comment. This end of the spectrum exacts a certain amount of inequity upon the
creditors, but is justified in doing so because of the nature of the lender’s actions.
This outcome should be applied in only the most egregious of circumstances or
where a creditor persistently makes TILA violations.154
In order for equilibrium to be achieved under the “balancing rescission
model,” the parties must be returned to the positions they were in prior to the
transaction. This is accomplished by implementing section 1635(b) as it was
intended under the purest of circumstances. In this scenario, a debtor may choose
to rescind the transaction because of a minor technical violation or inadvertent
omission. The creditor releases the security interest and returns all fees to the
debtor, who then returns the principal amount of the loan. However, within this
zone of equilibrium, there may be room for an additional approach. This approach
would allow the creditor and debtor to modify the terms of repayment in the
rescission process. It may be viewed as a settlement-like process, allowing for the
debtor and creditor to achieve a resolution that satisfies both parties.
To illustrate, in In re Sterten,155 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the “concept of permitting a consumer a
reasonable time frame to repay the creditor while the creditor retains the security
interest it acquired in the rescinded transaction to be a balanced, equitable
approach.”156 The In re Sterten court found that the creditor had made material
violations in the loan transaction with the debtor, but allowed the parties to
structure a repayment plan over an extended duration, at a reasonable interest
rate.157 Judge Frank found the material violation “was not a transaction that
involved any pervasive overreaching or irregularities . . . [and the] nature of the
statutory violation in this case would support a repayment period and an interest
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Perkins v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Perkins), 106 B.R. 863 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1989). In In re Perkins, the court reprimanded the creditor for persistent TILA violations in multiple
cases within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Because of the ongoing illegal behavior of the
creditors, the court relegated the creditor’s security interest to an unsecured status and awarded statutory
damages and attorney’s fees to the debtor. The court held that its “decision is one more in the consistent
line of cases which declines to excuse Mid-Penn for liability for the failure to correct practices which
have been consistently declared illegal since [an earlier] decision.” Id. at 865.
155. Sterten v. Option One Mortg. Corp. (In re Sterten), 352 B.R. 380 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
156. Id. at 387. See also Murken, supra note 7, at 473-74 (citing Shepeard v. Quality Siding &
Window Factory, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Del. 1990) (allowing debtor to repay $11,361.58 in
monthly installments of $199); Mayfield v. Vanguard Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (allowing debtor to repay $16,113.62 in monthly installments of $171); Bookhart v. Mid-Penn
Consumer Disc. Co., 559 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing debtor to repay $3,412.20 in monthly
installments of $15)).
157. In re Sterten, 352 B.R. at 390.
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rate more favorable to Option One.”158 The balancing approach employed by the
court allowed the transaction to be rescinded by stretching the boundaries of equity
to its outermost limits. By allowing the creditor to receive payment over an
extended period of time, and reducing the payments to a level that was affordable
by the debtor, the court found the intensive fact-finding mission to be an equitable
mechanism for complying with TILA.159 Although this “repayment” approach
arguably strikes a balance between the debtor and the creditor, the scale has the
potential to tip slightly in favor of one side. The creditor may be getting a less
favorable interest rate than they originally contracted for, over a longer period of
time—tipping in favor of the debtor. Conversely, a debtor may be obligated to
future payments that are affordable, but slightly suffocating under the weight of
other bankruptcy creditors. Thus, the repayment method has the advantage of
allowing the parties to leave the bankruptcy table with a little something in hand,
but arguably less than they would have hoped. This approach may require more
legwork on the part of the court, but it offers an equitable solution where none is
otherwise provided.
For the “balanced rescission” test to weigh in favor of creditors, a court would
need to find an unwarranted windfall in favor of the debtor. In this scenario, the
court should be more inclined to condition rescission on tender by the borrower
where the debtor would reap an unreasonable windfall because of a minor technical
violation. This situation may arise when a debtor attempts to rescind a loan, but the
debtor has already consumed the principal loan amount or has no ability to tender
their loan proceeds.
For example, in In re Requilman, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of California found that a court may condition the rescission of a
loan on tender by the borrower when “the TILA violation giving rise to the right to
rescind is not egregious, and where the lender would otherwise be left with an
unsecured claim in the borrower’s bankruptcy.”160 In In re Requilman, the
borrowers executed two refinancing loans, each secured by their principal
residence.161 Less than three years later, the borrowers filed a petition for Chapter
7 bankruptcy, at which point the Chapter 7 trustee handled the estate.162 The
trustee found a minor TILA violation within one of the loans and sought rescission

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Requilan (In re Requilman), No. 08-32240 TEC, 2009 WL 4929397,
at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (citing Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1171). Judge Carlson further
explained:
[W]hether a decree of rescission should be conditional depends upon the equities present
in a particular case, as well as consideration of the legislative policy of full disclosure that
underlies the Truth in Lending Act . . . in LaGrone we held that rescission should be
conditioned on repayment of the amounts advanced by the lender. We noted that the
TILA violations there were not egregious . . . and that the equities favored the creditor
who would otherwise have been left in an unsecured position in the borrower’s
intervening bankruptcy.
Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1171.
161. In re Requilman, 2009 WL 4929397, at *1.
162. Id.
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under TILA.163 Because the trustee was unable to tender back the principal on the
loan, Judge Carlson held that the court “can deny rescission at any time it
determines that the borrower cannot make the required tender.”164 In In re
Requilman, the court was faced with the possible inequities that would be visited
upon the creditor in the absence of conditional rescission. Judge Carlson explained
that the conditioning of rescission upon tender by the trustee was appropriate by
stating:
[T]here is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after
deciding that rescission is warranted, may not do so before deciding that rescission
is warranted when it finds that, assuming grounds for rescission exist, rescission
still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the
borrower’s rescission obligations no matter what. Such a decision lies within the
court’s equitable discretion, taking into consideration all the circumstances
including the nature of the violations and the borrower’s ability to repay the
proceeds. In the present case, Trustee is unable to make the required tender
immediately. Trustee should not be afforded additional time to make the tender,
because the Bank will be entitled to take all the proceeds from a sale of the
Residence, whether or not the [] Loan is rescinded. In this situation, it would be
inequitable to continue to restrain the Bank from exercising its right to foreclose
upon the Residence, when such restraint would provide no meaningful benefit to
165
the bankruptcy estate or Debtor.

Cases like In re Requilman align with a court’s equitable power to condition
rescission on tender by the borrower.166 The approach that weighs in favor of the
creditors is closely related to the majority view because courts are cautious when
large consumer loans have the potential to be discharged in bankruptcy.
Thus, although the First Circuit has not expressly declared that it has the
equitable power to condition rescission on tender by the borrower, the
overwhelming case law and section 1635(b) of TILA imply that it does indeed
possess that power. The more important question is how should that power be
exercised? A bright-line application that holds all assertions of rescission are
conditioned upon a borrower tender is arguably too restrictive and weighted too
heavily in favor of creditors. Conversely, a strict adherence to the literal language
of section 1635(b) exposes creditors to potentially devastating losses in the
bankruptcy setting based upon minor technical violations.
Additionally, due to the current state of the housing market, many debtors in
163. Id.
164. Id. at *6.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Wepsic v. Josephson (In re Wepsic), 231 B.R. 768, 775 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998). The
In re Wepsic court explained:
The TILA rescission remedy provides that once the transaction in question is rescinded,
[debtor] must return any monies advanced to her by [creditor] and [creditor] must take
steps to release her security interest and return finance and other charges. Some courts
have struggled with the possibility of a creditor’s forfeiture when an indigent borrower
seeks to rescind a loan under TILA.
Id. (citing Trimmel v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 555 F. Supp. 264, 267-68 (D. Conn. 1983)). “To
avoid such results courts have exercised their equitable discretion to condition the rescission on the
obligor’s tender of the monies advanced by the lender.” In re Wepsic, 231 B.R. at 775.
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bankruptcy are able to “strip off” second mortgages and residence-related loans via
the lien avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Consequently, the eligible
debtor in Chapter 13 may find the “strip off” provisions of the Code more useful
and more affordable than the process of rescission. Also, many refinanced or
consolidated loans will not be eligible for rescission pursuant to the language of
Regulation Z.167 As long as the debtor’s home has no equity to support the
underlying obligations, they can treat that obligation as a general unsecured claim
subject to similar treatment as their credit card debt. Currently, this is achieved
quite easily because of the declining value of homes coupled with many debtors’
burdensome second mortgage loans. The “strip off” provisions are not helpful for
those debtors looking to rescind their primary mortgage because these mortgages
will always be supported by equity and would be disqualified from lien avoidance.
Although the “balancing rescission model” is more labor and fact intensive, it
allows a court to merge the concepts of equity with a statutory scheme. By
examining the behavior and financial climate of the parties involved, courts are
better able to avoid inequities. This avoidance stems from a court’s freedom to not
be bound by inconsistent case law or statutes that are silent on the issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Comment has illustrated, how rescission is treated in bankruptcy is
uncertain and unsettled. The competing rationales among the circuits have created
a philosophical divide on the issue: the majority, arguing that rescission under
TILA intends to return creditors and debtors to their positions prior to the
transaction and, the minority, arguing that rescission is a punitive remedy for TILA
violations. The role of equity within a statutory framework has allowed the
bankruptcy courts to speak where the Code is silent, but the voices are saying
different things. In order to harmonize these competing rationales, the First Circuit
will need to strike a balance between the Bankruptcy Code, the language of TILA
or applicable state equivalents, and the principles of equity. The careful weighing
of the competing interests may actualize this balance by focusing on the facts and
behavior of the parties involved. This balancing act may demand judges and courts
to expend more time and energy on the details and nuances within their cases, but
that is the unintended consequence when the law is painted in shades of gray.

167. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2) (2010). Regulation Z states in relevant part:
(f) Exempt transactions. The right to rescind does not apply to the following:
...
(2) A refinancing or consolidation by the same creditor of an extension of credit
already secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling. The right of rescission shall
apply, however, to the extent the new amount financed exceeds the unpaid
principal balance, any earned unpaid finance charge on the existing debt, and
amounts attributed solely to the costs of the refinancing or consolidation.
Id.

